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FREE CIRCULATION OF SERVICES IN
MERCOSUR: A PENDING TASK
Gabriel Gari*
I. INTRODUCTIONBY the mid 1980s, fresh winds were blowing in the southern cone of
South America. The return to democracy had left behind a dec-
ade of military governments. In their effort to recover from the
1980s sovereign debt crisis, countries in the region were beginning to
carry out domestic reforms towards more market-based and open eco-
nomic systems. These new political and economic values encouraged re-
surgence in integration initiatives.' On March 26, 1991, Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion with the
purpose of creating the Southern Common Market, an economic integra-
tion agreement involving the free movement of goods, services, and fac-
tors of production. 2
MERCOSUR's original objective was to establish the common market
by December 31, 1994. However, thirteen years later, the free circulation
of services is one of the many ambitious goals spelled out in the treaty
that is yet to be achieved. During these years, MERCOSUR has proven
to be a successful instrument for the removal of border barriers to trade,
but quite inefficacious in disciplining trade practices and addressing
within-the-border barriers to trade. In the services sector, an area of
trade particularly sensitive to within-the-border measures, scant results
have been achieved.
*Researcher, Center for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary, University of
London., g.gari@qmul.ac.uk and ggariuk@yahoo.co.uk. The author acknowledges
the insights of Mauricio Baquero-Herrera. Any errors or omissions are the re-
sponsibility of the author alone.
1. Regional economic integration agreements were quite common in Latin America
during the 1960s, but MERCOSUR differs significantly from these integration ex-
periences. MERCOSUR was envisaged as an open initiative aimed at facilitating
a broad and competitive insertion of its Members into the global markets. The
integration initiatives during the 1960s, on the contrary, were among closed econo-
mies based on import substitution industrialization models and their objective was
to expand national markets into regional markets maintaining high levels of exter-
nal protection. For a detailed analysis on the differences between "old regional-
ism" and "new regionalism," see ROBERT DEVLIN & ANTONI ESTEVADEORDAL,
WHAT'S NEW IN THE NEW REGIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS? (Inter American De-
velopment Bank (IADB), Working Paper No. 6, 2001), available at http://www/
iadb/org/intallpublicaciones/devlin-estevadeordalWP6.pdf.
2. See Tratado de Asunci6n [Treaty of Asuncion], Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-
Uru., 30 I.L.M. 1041, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy. The Treaty of
Asuncion entered into force on November 29, 1991.
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MERCOSUR's poor performance in furthering the liberalization of
trade-in services contrasts with the dynamism of the services sector and
its increasing importance for the growth and development of the econ-
omy.3 By failing to provide the service markets with openness, trans-
parency, and certainty, MERCOSUR is not only unfulfilling its own
mandate, but also preventing its Members from reaping the benefits of
free trade in this vibrant and promising economic sector.
The purpose of this paper is to examine MERCOSUR's integration
process as it relates to services and analyze the hurdles that have pre-
vented MERCOSUR from meeting the necessary conditions for the free
circulation of services within the bloc. Section II traces the place of ser-
vices in MERCOSUR's agenda since its inception until present times
Section III focuses on the regulatory framework for trade-in services and
assesses its advantages and disadvantages. Section IV reviews the current
status of the services' liberalization program, analyzing Members' specific
commitments on market access and national treatment. Section V exam-
ines the main obstacles to the liberalization of trade-in services. Finally,
section VI looks ahead, providing some hints on how the current status of
services' integration can evolve in the medium and long terms.
II. TRACING THE PLACE OF SERVICES IN
MERCOSUR'S AGENDA
The negotiations on the liberalization of services are one of the many
issues that occupy the complex agenda for the establishment of a com-
mon market. Over the last thirteen years, the content of the negotiating
agenda has varied along with the different challenges that tested
MERCOSUR Members' commitment to the integration process. This
section contains a brief review of the place trade-in services has had in
MERCOSUR's agenda since its creation. Placing the negotiations on
services in a wider negotiation context contributes to the understanding
of the overall challenges that need to be addressed by a regional integra-
tion process before it can advance into a deeper level of integration in-
volving the free circulation of services. The review will be divided into
four periods: (1) transitional period (1991 - 1994); (2) deepening period
(1995 - 1998); (3) crisis period (1999 - 2002); and (4) current situation
(2003 to present). 4
3. See WTO, GATS - Fact and Fiction, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-
e/serv-e/gats-factfiction-e.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2004). According to the
W'TO, services is the largest and fastest growing sector of the world economy and
for the past two decades trade-in services has grown faster than merchandise trade.
Id.
4. For a comprehensive analysis of the first three periods, see Roberto Bouzas, El
MERCOSUR Diez Afios Despus. ZProceso de Aprendizaje o Djdt Vu?
[MERCOSUR Ten Years Later. Learning Process or D~jA vu?], 41 DESAROLLO
ECONOMiCO 179, 180-86 (2001).
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A. TRANSITIONAL PERIOD 1991-1994
The transitional period covers the years between March 26, 1991, the
date the Treaty of Asuncion was signed, and December 31, 1994, the date
the common market should have been in place. 5 During this period, ne-
gotiating efforts were focused on the liberalization of trade-in goods, the
implementation of a common external tariff, and the development of an
institutional framework. Trade-in services were not a priority and little
was achieved in this area.
A trade liberalization program aimed at removing tariffs on trade-in
goods was successfully implemented. By the end of the transitional pe-
riod, more than 85 percent of intra-regional trade flows were benefiting
from zero-tariffs.6 This achievement was coupled with an impressive
growth in intra-regional trade, which increased from 1991 to 1994 at an
average annual rate of 25 percent.7 Significant advances were also made
in the negotiation of the Common External Tariff (CET), albeit the re-
sults achieved on this issue were not as successful as the liberalization of
tariff barriers to trade. After demanding negotiations, Member States
agreed on a CET and a customs code.8 The CET covered approximately
85 percent of products imported into the region,9 while a degree of flexi-
bility allowed each country to exclude from the CET a list of national
exceptions, with the commitment to phase them out within a given term.
Finally, two significant steps were taken towards the development of
MERCOSUR's institutional framework: (1) the signature of the Brasilia
Protocol, 10 establishing a dispute settlement system; and (2) the Ouro
Preto Protocol,11 specifying the composition, duties, and decision-making
procedures of MERCOSUR's political, administrative, and consultative
bodies.
The fact that during this period priority was given to the liberalization
of trade-in goods, the negotiation on a CET, and the development of the
institutional infrastructure, does not mean that other dimensions relevant
to the functioning of a common market were neglected. On the contrary,
in June 1992, the Common Market Council (CMC) approved a broad and
5. See Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 2, art. 1, 30 I.L.M. at 1044-45.
6. See Bouzas, supra note 4, at 182.
7. See Centro de Economia Internacional [Centre for International Economy],
Cuadros Estadisticos MERCOSUR, at http://www.cei.gov.ar/html/estadistica.htm#
mer (last visited Sept. 11, 2004) [hereinafter MERCOSUR's Statistics Tables].
8. See Common Market Council (CMC) Decision 07/94 of Aug. 4,1994, available at
http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy/paginalesp.htm.
9. See CARLOS SEPULVEDA & ARTURO VERA AGUIRRE, MERCOSUR: ACHIEVE-
MENTS AND CHALLENGES 11 (IADB, Working Paper No. 222, 1997).
10. See Brasilia Protocol, Dec. 17, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., 36 L.L.M. 691, available
at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy. The Brasilia Protocol entered into force on
April 24, 1993.
11. See Ouro Preto Protocol, Dec. 17, 1994, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., 34 I.L.M. 1244,
available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy. The Ouro Preto Protocol entered
into force on December 15, 1995.
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ambitious working program 12 covering a wide variety of topics, from
technical standards to industrial relations and social security issues. De-
tailed tasks were assigned to eleven Sub Working Groups (SWG) and one
Ad Hoc Group on institutional aspects.
Trade-in services was one of the seven topics that SWG No. 10 "Coor-
dination of Macroeconomic Policies," had to deal with. A commission on
trade-in services, formed under the umbrella of SWG No. 10, was as-
signed the task of reviewing the domestic legal systems of each Member
State and proposing an agreement for the regulation of trade-in services
by December 1993. By then, the agreement was not finished, but some
progress was made on certain sector-specific service areas, for instance,
the adoption of some measures that aimed at harmonizing financial regu-
lations.' 3 In addition, Members signed two protocols on the promotion
and protection of investments with a view to disciplining investment poli-
cies - one on intra-zone investments1 4 and another one regarding invest-
ments from third countries. 15
B. DEEPENING PERIOD 1995 - 1998
The deepening period covers the years between two contrasting
hallmarks in MERCOSUR's history. On the one hand, the entry into
force of the CET in January 1995, highlighted the strength of the integra-
tion process, at a time when its credibility was at one of its highest levels.
On the other hand, in January 1999, the Brazilian's currency devaluation
represented the most serious breach of a Member's political commitment
to the integration process so far, which brought MERCOSUR's credibil-
ity to one of its lowest levels.
12. See Las Lcfias Schedule, approved by CMC Decision 01/92 of June 24, 1992,
amended by CMC Decision 01/93 of July 1, 1993, available at http://www.
MERCOSUR.org.uy/paginalesp.htm.
13. See CMC Decision 08/93 of Jan. 17, 1993, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.
org.uy/paginalesp.htm (describing the harmonization of capital markets' regula-
tions); CMC Decision 10/93 of Jan. 17, 1993, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.
org.uy/paginalesp.htm (describing the adoption of Basle Standards for the finan-
cial system); CMC Decision 12/94 of Dec. 16, 1994, available at http://www.
MERCOSUR.org.uy/paginalesp.htm (describing the adoption of Principles of
Consolidated Global Banking Supervision for the banking system).
14. See Protocolo de Colonia para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Recfproca de Inver-
siones en el MERCOSUR [Colonia Protocol on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments in MERCOSUR], approved by CMC Decision 11/93 of
Jan. 17, 1994, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy [hereinafter Colonia
Protocol]. This Protocol has not yet entered into force. So far, it has only been
ratified by Argentina. Law No. 24891 of Nov. 5, 1997 (Arg.), published by the
Official Bulletin on Dec. 9, 1997.
15. See Protocolo Sobre la Promoci6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones Provenientes de
Estados No Partes [Protocol on the Promotion and Protection of Investments from
Third Countries], approved by CMC Decision 11/94 of Aug. 5, 1994, available at
http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy/paginalesp.htm [hereinafter Protocol on Third
Countries' Investments]. This Protocol has not yet entered into force. So far it has
been ratified by Argentina, Law No. 24554 of Sept. 13, 1995 (Arg.), published in
the Official Bulletin on Oct. 18, 1995, and by Uruguay, Law No. 17531 of July 30,
2002 (Uru.), published in the Official Bulletin on Aug. 16, 2002.
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During this period, more attention was paid to services and some steps
towards its liberalization were taken. In 1997, the parties signed the
Montevideo Protocol, a general agreement on the regulation of trade-in
services in the bloc, 16 and initiated the negotiations on specific market
access and national treatment commitments. The following year, three
more steps towards the liberalization of services were taken. First, the
incorporation of four Annexes to the Montevideo Protocol with sector
specific provisions were added: (1) Annex on the Movement of Natural
Persons Supplying Services; (2) Annex on Financial Services ; (3) Annex
on Land and Waterway Transport Services; and (4) Annex on Air Trans-
port Services .17 Second, Member States concluded their list of initial
commitments on market access and national treatment. 18 And finally,
the creation of the Group of Services, an institutional upgrade, which re-
flected the importance that services were slowly gaining in the integration
agenda.' 9
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned achievements, the priority of
MERCOSUR's agenda during this period was placed elsewhere. Having
removed most of border barriers to trade and being motivated by the
region's economic performance during its initial phase of integration,
MERCOSUR Members were willing to advance into a deeper level of
integration. The negotiating agenda shifted from border barriers to
trade, to a wide range of within-the-border measures with a view to con-
solidate and improve the custom union and to bring MERCOSUR closer
to the establishment of a common market.20 It soon became apparent for
MERCOSUR Members how costly this stage would be.
The tasks to agree on the removal of tariffs on intraregional goods and
to implement a CET were not easy for MERCOSUR Members, but aided
16. See Protocolo de Montevideo Sobre el Comercio de Servicios del MERCOSUR
[Montevideo Protocol on Trade-in Services in MERCOSUR], approved by CMC
Decision 13/97 of Dec. 15, 1997, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy/
paginalesp.htm [hereinafter Montevideo Protocol]. This Protocol has not yet en-
tered into force. The Protocol will enter into force once it has been ratified by at
least three member countries. So far it has been ratified by Argentina, Law No.
25623 of July 17, 2002 (Arg.), published in the Official Bulletin Aug. 8, 2002, and
Brazil, Decreto Legislativo 335/2003 of July 24, 2003, published in the Union's Of-
ficial Bulletin on July 25, 2003 See infra Section III for a detailed analysis of this
agreement.
17. See CMC Decision 09/98 of July 23, 1998, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.
org.uy/paginalesp.htm.
18. These lists were based on the commitments agreed by the Member States with the
WTO, although with some minor improvements such as Brazil's inclusion of infor-
mation services. See MERCOSUR 1999-2000 64 (IADB-INTAL, Report No. 6,
2000), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/geograph/south/intal.pdf (2000) [herein-
after MERCOSUR REPORT No. 6].
19. See CMC Decision 31/98 of July 23, 1998, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.
org.uy/paginalesp.htm; see also CMG Res. 73/98 of Dec. 12, 1998, available at
http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy/paginalesp.htm (detailing the structure and
mode of functioning of the Group; it also includes an annex, which sets the guide-
lines for the negotiations on specific commitments).
20. See MERCOSUR's Working Programme 1995-2000, approved by CMC Decision
No. 9/95 of Dec. 12, 1995, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy.
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by a special adjustment regime for sensitive products in a context favored
by the region's positive economic performance, they managed to turn
those tasks into attainable goals. However, when the negotiating agenda
turned to the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade and to the harmoni-
zation of measures with trade distorting effects, little progress was
made,21 revealing that MERCOSUR Members were not ready to forfeit
the necessary degree of their economic and regulatory autonomy to ad-
dress these challenges. The fast deterioration of the global economic situ-
ation22 made things even more difficult, by mounting pressure over
MERCOSUR Members to opt for individual strategies in lieu of
MERCOSUR's disciplines. By the end of the deepening period, the re-
sults achieved were disappointing. What started as an ambitious plan fu-
elled by growing expectations and confidence in the integration process,
ended with an acute devaluation of MERCOSUR's largest partner's
currency.
C. CRISIS PERIOD 1999-2002
In the year 2000, a "re-launching program" for MERCOSUR was ap-
proved, including a series of measures aimed at addressing the integration
process' weaknesses.23 Attention was focused on five main areas: (1)
macroeconomic coordination; (2) CET; (3) market access; (4) fair compe-
tition; and (5) institutions. Negotiations on services continued, but it be-
came clear that more basic challenges should have been sorted out before
the free circulation of services in the region could be possible.
One of MERCOSUR's most serious deficits that the crises revealed
was the lack of macroeconomic coordination among its Members. The
economic prosperity of MERCOSUR's first years prevented the conse-
quences of this problem from being unfolded. It was when the crisis
erupted, at a time of growing economic interdependence, that the lack of
macroeconomic coordination became apparent,24 inflicting serious dam-
ages to the integration process. To address this problem, a series of mea-
sures were approved, including the creation of a Macroeconomic
Monitoring Group, the exchange of economic information, and the har-
monization of economic statistics.2 5 In addition, Members agreed on a
plan for macroeconomic convergence in the region, establishing common
21. See, e.g., the signature of the Protocolo de Defensa de la Competencia en el
MERCOSUR [Protocol to Safeguard Competition in MERCOSUR], approved by
CMC Decision 18/96 of Dec. 16, 1996, at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy [herein-
after Competition Protocol]. This protocol has not yet entered into force. It has
been ratified by Brazil, Decreto No. 3602 of Sept. 18, 2000, published in the
Union's Official Bulletin on Sept. 19, 2000.
22. See e.g., South East Asian Crisis in 1997, and Russian Crisis in 1998.
23. See CMC Decisions 22/00, 23/00, 24/00, 25/00, 26/00, 27/00, 28/00, 30/00, 31/00, 32/
00, of June 30, 2000, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy.
24. See, e.g., differences in the exchange rate regimes of the two largest partners of the
bloc.
25. See CMC Decision 30/00 of June 29, 2000, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.
org.uy.
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goals on inflation, fiscal, and current account deficits.2 6 The deepening of
the crisis in the following years prevented the plan from being fully
implemented.
Another problem, which already existed, but was exacerbated during
the crisis, was the Members' anticompetitive practices including, among
others, discriminatory subsidies and other incentives to domestic produc-
tion and unfair use of trade remedy mechanisms. The re-launching pro-
gram included a series of decisions aimed at disciplining MERCOSUR
Members' public policies and trade remedy measures distorting competi-
tion.27 In 2002, the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and on Anti-dumping were incor-
porated into MERCOSUR's legal system. 28 In addition, several mea-
sures were adopted to buttress the implementation of the CET, enhance
market access conditions for goods originating in the region, and improve
the agreement's institutional framework.
With respect to services, the focus was placed on the negotiation of
specific commitments on market access and national treatment. Member
States participated in three rounds of negotiations and launched the
fourth one in April 2002. During the first round of negotiations, no sig-
nificant improvements were made. The first list of specific commitments
barely improved Member's initial commitments. 29 In order to boost ne-
gotiation results, the Group of Services issued a second set of negotiating
guidelines aimed at reducing the number of unbound 30 commitments and
introducing more transparency to the commitments already under-
taken.31 Some results were achieved, but by the conclusion of the third
round of negotiations, Members' schedules of specific commitments con-
tinued to include a significant amount of unbound entries, and restric-
tions on market access and national treatment were not accurately
specified. Moreover, four years after it was signed, the Montevideo Pro-
tocol had not yet entered into force. 32
26. This plan was approved by a declaration of the Presidents of MERCOSUR, Bo-
livia (Associate Member of MERCOSUR since March 1997), and Chile (Associate
Member of MERCOSUR since October 1996) in December 2000.
27. See CMC Decision 28/00 of June 30, 2000 (Commercial and Competition De-
fence), available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy; CMC Decision 66/00 of Dec.
16, 2000 (Common Commercial Defence), available at http://www.MERCOSUR.
org.uy.
28. See CMC Decision 13/02 of July 5, 2002, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.
uy; CMC Decision 14/02 of July 5, 2002, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.
uy.
29. See MERCOSUR REPORT No 6, supra note 18, at 64.
30. In a country's list of specific commitments, an unbound entry for a specific services
sector means that the country reserves its right to pass regulations against the mar-
ket access or national treatment principles.
31. See CMG Res. 36/00 of June 28, 2000, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.
uy.
32. See supra note 16.
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D. CURRENT SITUATION
In 2003, the region's economic situation showed some signals of recov-
ery, 33 and new administrations took over in Brazil and Argentina. The
Brazilian President, Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, and the Argentinean Presi-
dent, N6stor Kirchner, both supported by left wing parties, have jointly
emphasized the importance of the social dimension of the integration
process and their vision of MERCOSUR as an instrument to increase
their bargaining power in the negotiations with third countries on the
conditions for the insertion of their economies into the global market. 34
While it is still premature to assess the impact of this new political scena-
rio on the integration process in general, and on the liberalization of ser-
vices in particular, a review of MERCOSUR's Working Program 2004 -
200635 can shed light on which direction the integration process is now
heading.
The wide coverage of this working program reflects the current leaders'
emphasis on a holistic approach to the integration process.3 6 The eco-
nomic-commercial section is focused on: (1) the coordination of
macroeconomic policies; (2) a complete implementation of the CET
(without lists of exceptions, avoiding double levies, and with a regional
mechanism for tariff revenue collection and distribution); (3) the removal
of non-tariff barriers to trade, and (4) the disciplining of anti-competitive
practices. The social section includes measures on a wide range of issues,
from judicial cooperation to human rights protection, with particular em-
phasis on the promotion of civil society participation in the integration
process. The institutional section covers plans to: (1) discuss the creation
of a MERCOSUR Parliament; (2) complete the transformation of the
Administrative Secretariat into a Technical Secretariat; and (3) approve a
mechanism to introduce the direct effect system for MERCOSUR norms.
Finally, the Working Program 2004-2006 contains measures aimed at pro-
moting regional cooperation strategies for the provision of public goods,
which is a dimension of the integration process that so far has been over-
33. See MERCOSUR's Statistics Tables, supra note 7. The volume of MERCOSUR's
intraregional trade for 2003 was US$ 25,646 million, a 25% increase in relation to
2002 (US$ 20,462m) but still 38% below its 1997 level (US$ 41,074m).
34. See Embassy of Brazil in London, Buenos Aires Consensus, available at http://
www.brazil.org.uklpage.php?cid=1654 (Oct. 16, 2003). A declaration by the Bra-
zilian and Argentinean presidents expressing their common views on several issues
ranging from economic and social polices to regional integration and international
affairs. Considering its content, the name of the declaration seems to be not only a
way to reaffirm the political coincidences among the presidents, but also to under-
score their disagreement with the economic policies associated with the Washing-
ton Consensus. The emphasis on the social dimension of integration is also
reflected on the MERCOSUR's Joint Presidential Communications of June 18,
2003 and August 15, 2003.
35. See CMC Decision 26/03 of Dec. 16, 2003, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.
org.uy.
36. It is important to clarify that MERCOSUR has never been a purely economic
arrangement, including from its inception political, cultural, social, and environ-
mental aspects of integration.
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looked. The areas for cooperation that the program covers are scientific
and technological cooperation, physical infrastructure, and energy
integration.
Despite its breadth, the Working Program 2004-2006 does not include
specific measures on trade-in services. 37 In December 2003, the fourth
round of negotiations concluded in this sector, and the fifth round was
launched. Compared with previous rounds, the results of the fourth
round of negotiations reveal that some progress has been made, not only
in terms of the increased number of bound commitments, but also in
terms of the enhanced transparency of the schedules. The schedules now
specify the measures that limit the application of market access and na-
tional treatment principles with more precision. 38 In addition, an agree-
ment for the creation of a MERCOSUR visa, establishing common rules
to facilitate the temporal movement of natural persons supplying ser-
vices, has been approved. 39  However, bearing in mind that
MERCOSUR's ultimate goal is the free circulation of services, the cur-
rent state of affairs is far from satisfactory. Furthermore, the legal uncer-
tainty derived from the Members' failure to ratify the Montevideo
Protocol and to incorporate in their domestic jurisdictions the CMC's De-
cisions approving the results of the rounds of negotiations overshadows
the results achieved.
In summary, this short revision of MERCOSUR's first thirteen years of
existence illustrates the connections between the liberalization of trade-in
services and the integration process as a whole. To meet the conditions
for the free circulation of services is something that not only depends on
the results of the negotiation rounds on services, but more importantly,
on the Members' capacity to secure open and stable markets and fair
competition conditions within the bloc. So far, Members have encoun-
tered serious difficulties to make progress in either of these two areas.
III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
TRADE-IN SERVICES
The main instrument for the regulation of trade-in services in
MERCOSUR is the Montevideo Protocol on Trade-in Services and its
four annexes on the movement of natural persons supplying services, fi-
nancial services, land and waterway transport services, and air transport
services. 40
Comparative analyses of international agreements have shown a vari-
ety of options to regulate trade-in services and to advance its liberaliza-
37. There is only one minor reference to trade-in services in a section discussing mea-
sures on competition policy.
38. See infra Section IV for a detailed review of current schedules of specific
commitments.
39. See CMC Decision No. 16/03 of Dec. 15, 2003, available at http://www.
MERCOSUR.org.uy.
40. See Montevideo Protocol, supra note 16.
20041
554 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
tion.41 Stephenson's findings show that while all agreements contain
general rules and disciplines for trade-in services and specific provisions
for the liberalization of such trade, they may differ in their scope of appli-
cation, in the approach adopted by them towards the liberalization of
trade-in services, and in the depth and coverage of the rules and disci-
plines governing trade-in services. 42 The Montevideo Protocol will be re-
viewed against this backdrop, comparing the path chosen by
MERCOSUR Members with other options that could have been taken,
with a view to assess its suitability for promoting the liberalization of
trade-in services in the bloc.
A. SCOPE OF APPLICATION
The structure and content of the Montevideo Protocol are based on the
General Agreement on Trade-in Services (GATS). Like GATS, the Pro-
tocol's scope of application covers "measures adopted by Member States
affecting trade-in services" in MERCOSUR. 43 Its rules and disciplines
apply to the four possible modes of service supply: (1) cross-border; (2)
consumption abroad; (3) commercial presence in the consuming country;
and (4) presence of natural persons.44 In addition, the Protocol's rules
and disciplines apply to all service sectors with the exception of those
governmental services that are not supplied on a commercial basis or in
competition with one or more service suppliers.45 This initial broad defi-
nition of the Protocol's scope of application spelled out in its first two
articles is subsequently subject to important limitations on the modes of
supply and service sectors covered by both.
The application of the Protocol's rules and disciplines on mode of sup-
ply three - commercial presence - is further limited by provisions in-
cluded in the Colonia Protocol on the Promotion and Reciprocal
41. See Sherry M. Stephenson & Francisco Prieto, Evaluating Approaches to the Liber-
alization of Trade-in Services: Insights from Regional Experience in the Americas,
in TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: A
HANDBOOK (2001); Sherry M. Stephenson, The Growing Participation in Multilat-
eral Services Liberalization by Latin America and the Caribbean, in LATIN
AMERICA: ITS FuTuRE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 165 (Patricia Rich ed., 2001)
[hereinafter Stephenson Growing Participation]; Sherry M. Stephenson, A Com-
parison of Existing Services Trade Arrangements within APEC, in IMPEDIMENTS TO
TRADE-IN SERVICES-MEASUREMENTFS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 287 (Christo-
pher Findlay & Tony Warren eds., 2000) [hereinafter A Comparison of Existing
Services Trade Arrangements within APEC]; SHERRY M. STEPHENSON, DEEPENING
DISCIPLINES FOR TRADE-IN SERVICES: TRANSPARENCY, DOMESTIC REGULATION
AND RECOGNITION, OAS Trade Unit Studies (2001) [hereinafter DEEPENING DIS-
CIPLINES FOR TRADE-IN SERVICES]; Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA,
Provisions on Trade-In Services in Trade and Integration Agreements of the Western
Hemisphere, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/ngsv/publications/en-
glish/srv-toc.asp (Oct. 25, 1999).
42. See A Comparison of Existing Services Trade Arrangements within APEC, supra
note 41, at 288.
43. See Montevideo Protocol, supra note 16, art. I.
44. See id. art. II, § 2.
45. See id. art. 1I, § 3(b)-(c).
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Protection of Investments in MERCOSUR. 46 In this instrument, each
Member State has included a list of sectors where they reserve their right
not to afford national treatment to foreign investors coming into their
territories.47
The application of the Protocol's rules and disciplines on mode of sup-
ply four - presence of natural persons - is further limited by provisions
included in the Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Ser-
vices. First, the Annex excludes from the reach of the Protocol's rules
and disciplines all those measures affecting natural persons seeking em-
ployment in other Members' markets48 and those measures regarding cit-
izenship, residence, or employment on a permanent basis.49 In addition,
the Annex insulates from the Protocol's rules and disciplines the Member
States' right to regulate the entry of natural persons into their territory.50
These two provisions constitute a step backwards in the process of ad-
vancing the liberalization of trade-in services by preventing the Protocol
from disciplining one of the most important modes of supply of services.
As a consequence, business services and other dynamic sectors where ser-
vices are mainly provided by natural persons will be prevented from reap-
ing the benefits of free trade-in services. Highly trained professionals will
not be able to access foreign markets and consumers' options will con-
tinue to be limited to local service providers.
With respect to the service sectors covered, there is an additional limi-
tation to the Protocol's scope of application that has to do with the gov-
ernment procurement of services. The Protocol exempts Member States
from observing their most favorable nation, national treatment, and mar-
ket access obligations when it comes to ". . .laws, regulations, or require-
ments governing the procurement by governmental agencies of services
purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial
resale or with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial
sale. ' 51 Considering the economic relevance of governments' demand for
services, this provision introduces an important constraint on the Proto-
col's capacity to advance the services' liberalization process. That is the
reason why the article also calls Member States to negotiate an agree-
ment on Government Procurement and to apply its disciplines to the pro-
46. The commercial presence mode of supply involves a foreign services supplier set-
ting a branch or a subsidiary in the territory of another Member. This operation is
closer to a direct investment transaction than to an arm's length trade transaction.
Therefore, for the purpose of determining the scope of application of the national
treatment principle it is necessary to complement the provisions of the Monte-
video Protocol with the provisions of the Colonia Protocol. See id.; see also
Colonia Protocol, supra note 14, arts. 2-3, Annex 1, art. 1.
47. See Colonia Protocol, supra note 14, Annex 1, art. 1.
48. It must be noted that it is not at all easy to draw the borderline between natural
persons seeking employment and natural persons seeking to provide services.
49. See WTO, Services Agreement: Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying
Services Under the Agreement, § 2, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-
e/serve/8-anmvnt e.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2004).
50. See id. § 3.
51. See Montevideo Protocol, supra note 16, art. XV, § 1.
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curement of services. 52
Finally, the broad definition of the Protocol's scope of application con-
tained in its first two articles is also curtailed by the provisions governing
the Protocol's approach towards the liberalization of trade-in services,
which are analyzed in the following section.
B. APPROACH TOWARDS THE LIBERALIZATION OF
TRADE-IN SERVICES
A comparative review of trade-in services agreements reveal that there
are two main ways to approach the liberalization of such trade: (1) the
"positive list" or "bottom-up" approach; and (2) the "negative list" or
"top-down" approach.53 The scope of coverage of fundamental princi-
ples for the liberalization of trade-in services most favored nation, na-
tional treatment, and market access over modes of supply and service
sectors depend, to a large extent, on which of these approaches is chosen.
The Montevideo Protocol adopts the positive list approach on market
access and national treatment. 54 According to this approach, Member
States are required not to maintain or adopt measures that limit the ac-
cess of foreign services or foreign service suppliers to the domestic mar-
ket in the areas where specific market-access commitments are
undertaken. In the same vein, each Member is obligated not to treat the
service and service suppliers of another Member any less favorable than
its own service and service suppliers in the areas where specific national
treatment commitments are undertaken. It is up to each Member State
to define the scope of its list of specific commitments. Therefore, the
scope of application of these two fundamental principles for services lib-
eralization is constrained to the service sectors where specific commit-
ments are undertaken. This approach to services' liberalization differs
from the negative list approach. In this case, all parties to an agreement
undertake the obligation to grant market access and to accord national
treatment to all foreign services and foreign services suppliers in all sec-
tors, unless otherwise specified in a list of exemptions or non-conforming
measures that are set out in an annex.
In theory, both approaches could lead to the same degree of liberaliza-
tion. In practice, however, the positive list approach entails a much more
conservative path.55 By advancing the liberalization of services through
the negotiations on specific commitments, Member States can save them-
selves from the difficult task of having to identify at the beginning of the
negotiation process all those service sectors that, due to their strategic
52. See Protocolo de Contrataciones Ptiblicas del MERCOSUR [Protocol on Govern-
ment Procurement in MERCOSUR], Dec. 15, 2003. This Protocol has not yet
entered into force.
53. See A Comparison of Existing Services Trade Arrangements within APEC, supra
note 41, at 288.
54. See Montevideo Protocol, supra note 16, art. VII.
55. See Stephenson & Prieto, supra note 41, at 1, for more details on the advantages
and disadvantages of the positive list approach and the negative list approach.
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relevance, would not be wise to liberalize. It also protects the scope of
Member States' policy options with regard to services that could be de-
veloped in the future. The positive list approach is also applied by the
GATS, while the negative list approach is applied, among others, by the
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and by the bilateral
free trade agreements between each NAFTA Member and third
countries. 56
From a multilateral perspective, the use of a positive list in a regional
agreement can be problematic. Because regional agreements represent a
departure from the Iiiost favored nation treatment principle, multilateral
trade agreements have set strict standards for their approval with the aim
of minimizing the negative impact of this departure on the world trading
system. Article V of GATS establishes that WTO Members can enter
into regional agreements with the purpose of liberalizing trade-in ser-
vices, provided that the agreement "has a substantial sectoral coverage"
and provides for the absence or elimination of "substantially all discrimi-
nation. '57 By choosing the positive list approach, it is less likely that the
Montevideo Protocol will be able to raise the liberalization of trade-in
services to a level that meets Article V's standards within a "reasonable
time-frame." 58
In addition, it is debatable whether a positive list approach is appropri-
ate for a regional integration agreement that aims to establish a common
market involving the free circulation of services. The fact that some
Member States have chosen the negative list approach in the bilateral
agreements they have entered into with third-world countries, 59 makes
MERCOSUR's positive list choice even more questionable.
C. SPECIFIC RULES AND DISCIPLINES
General principles, such as market access and national treatment, are
not sufficient to secure the liberalization of trade-in services. Barriers to
trade-in services pervade domestic legal systems and are difficult to iden-
tify. For an effective removal of these barriers and to provide service
markets with predictable, certain, and transparent conditions, it is also
necessary to resort to specific rules and disciplines. That is why, apart
from the general principles of non-discrimination and market access,
56. See e.g., Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Chile, June 6, 2003, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/chiusa e/chiusaind e.asp; Free Trade Agreement be-
tween the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Chile,
Dec. 5, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1079; Tratado de Libre Comercio Mex.-Bol., Jan. 1, 1995,
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mexbo-s/mbind.asp.
57. See General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, art. V, § 1(a)-
(b), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1168 [hereinafter GATS].
58. Id. art. V, § l(b)(ii). Regional integration agreements should meet WTO stan-
dards within ten years of their signature.
59. See Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Uruguay y Mexico, Nov. 15, 2003, art. 10-06,
§ 2, available at http://www.sice.oas.org /Trade/mexuruftas/mexuruind_s.asp.
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trade-in services agreements include provisions that seek to improve the
amount and quality of information on services' regulations, to discipline
Member States' right to regulate services, and to promote mutual recog-
nition agreements on standards or other criteria for the authorization,
licensing, or certification of services suppliers. The following paragraphs
look at the main specific rules and disciplines contained in the Monte-
video Protocol.
1. Transparency
The provision and consumption of services tend to be permeated by
several laws, decrees, and administrative procedures dealing with issues
that range from technical standards to licensing requirements. The lack
of information on these regulations can act as a de facto market access
barrier. Foreign service suppliers are particularly vulnerable to this prob-
lem. The lack of direct effect of MERCOSUR norms makes things even
more difficult for them, because as well as collecting information on do-
mestic regulations, they have to check whether MERCOSUR norms that
are relevant to their service sector have been incorporated into Member
States' domestic legal systems. Thus, prompt access to accurate informa-
tion on services' regulations is vital to secure open and transparent condi-
tions for services markets. Like most agreements on trade-in services, the
Montevideo Protocol contains some provisions to deal with this problem.
According to article VIII, each Member State is under the obligation to
publish, before they enter into force, all measures affecting trade-in ser-
vices. In addition, each Member has to inform the MERCOSUR Trade
Commission (MTC) at least once a year, about the adoption of new regu-
lations or the amendment of existing ones that affect trade-in services, as
well as establishing inquiry points to provide other Members with specific
information on services' regulations. The implementation costs of these
provisions are quite significant because of the breadth of measures that
may affect trade and the paucity of systematized information about them.
To date, little has been achieved in this area. Information technology
and, in particular, the Internet, are tools that can improve this situation at
a relatively low cost.
2. Domestic Regulation
The services sector is usually the most regulated sector of the economy
and regulations can create unnecessary barriers to trade or discriminate
among service providers. Therefore, in order to secure transparent and
predictable conditions for service transactions, and for promoting an ef-
fective liberalization of trade-in services, it is essential to discipline Mem-
ber States' right to regulate the services market. For this purpose, all
agreements on trade-in services include provisions that set standards on
how States can exercise their right to regulate the services market. The
scope of application of these standards and their degree of specificity var-
ies. The Montevideo Protocol's provision on domestic regulation repro-
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duces article VI of GATS, although there are some differences. 60
First, the Protocol's provision on domestic regulation places a general
duty on each Member to ensure that all measures of general application
affecting trade-in services are administered in a "reasonable, objective,
and impartial manner. ' 61 This is a horizontal commitment, contrary to
GATS' provision, where the scope of application of this duty is restricted
to sectors where specific commitments are undertaken.
Like GATS' provision, the Protocol requires Members to implement
independent tribunals or procedures where affected service providers can
bring their case to review administrative decisions affecting trade-in
services. 62
In those cases where any kind of authorization is required for the sup-
ply of a service, Member States must inform applicants of their decision
and of the status of their application when so requested. 63 Again, this is a
duty stricter than its GATS parallel because its scope of application is not
restricted to sectors where specific commitments are undertaken.
Measures related to qualification requirements and procedures, techni-
cal standards, and licensing requirements must comply with a set of more
specific standards including, inter alia, that such requirements "are based
on objective and transparent criteria," that they "are not unnecessarily
onerous for assuring quality of service," and in the case of licensing pro-
cedures, that they "do not constitute in themselves restrictions on the
provision of services." 64
Finally, the Protocol includes a provision that aims to strike the diffi-
cult balance between each Member's right to regulate services in order to
meet their national policy objectives and the overall agreement's objec-
tive to advance the liberalization of services in the bloc. This provision
allows each Member to introduce new regulations on services, including
provisions on market access and national treatment, provided that they
do not nullify or impair their commitments derived from the Protocol and
from their list of specific commitments. A decision of the CMC has sub-
sequently specified this criterion by automatically exempting
MERCOSUR Members from market access restrictions and national
treatment limitations that could be included in future regulations of cur-
rently unregulated service sectors.65
In sum, article X is a powerful tool to discipline Member States' do-
mestic regulatory practices, which can have unpredictable consequences
on the integration process. Once the Montevideo Protocol and the
60. See Montevideo Protocol, supra note 16, art. X.
61. See id. art. X, § 1.
62. See id. art. X, § 2
63. See id. art. X, § 3
64. See id. art X, § 4
65. See CMC Decision No. 11/01 of Dec. 21, 2001, available at http://www.
MERCOSUR.org.uy.
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Olivos Protocol66 enter into force, the MERCOSUR's Permanent Re-
view Tribunal could be called to review a Member's right to regulate the
services market, constrained only by quite broad standards of review. As
a result, a non-political body may end up dealing with politically sensitive
issues on a purely technical basis. While this could be an effective mecha-
nism to advance the liberalization of services, it also entails the risk to
create an imbalance of power between MERCOSUR's political and non-
political bodies, especially in an integration process where every step that
has been taken demanded intense political negotiations. 67
3. Recognition
Differences between countries in their standards or criteria for the au-
thorization, licensing, or certification of service suppliers are common-
place. These differences can constitute an obstacle to trade-in services, as
they prevent a service provider qualified in one jurisdiction from supply-
ing services in another jurisdiction where the qualification is not recog-
nized To avoid this problem, countries enter into mutual recognition
agreements by which each party to the agreement recognizes the educa-
tion or experience gained, requirements met, or licenses granted to ser-
vice providers in the territory of other parties to the agreement. These
agreements facilitate trade-in services among the parties to the recogni-
tion agreement, but they work to the disadvantage of service providers
from third countries, for whom it becomes more difficult to access the
service market of the parties to the agreement. 68 Thus, for advancing the
liberalization of trade-in services, it is necessary not only to promote mu-
tual recognition agreements between countries, but also to discipline each
country's recognition practice in order to avoid discriminatory
arrangements.
The Protocol addresses this problem in article XI. According to this
provision, each Member State is entitled to recognize unilaterally or
through an agreement the education or experience obtained by a service
provider in the territory of any other Member State or in a third State,
without being under the obligation to extend that recognition to other
Member States. However, to avoid the recognition of qualifications from
constituting a means of discrimination between countries, each Member
66. See Protocolo de Olivos para la Soluci6n de Controversias [Olivos Protocol for the
Settlement of Disputes], Feb. 18, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 2, available at http://www.
MERCOSUR.org.uy [hereinafter Protocolo de Olivos]. This Protocol has not en-
tered into force. It has been ratified by Brazil, Decreto Legislativo No. 712/2003
of Oct. 14, 2003 (Braz.), published in the Union's Official Bulletin on Oct. 15,
2003; by Uruguay, Law No. 17629 of Apr. 30, 2003 (Uru.), published in the Official
Bulletin on May 6, 2003, and by Argentina, Law No. 25663 of Oct. 18, 2002 (Arg.),
published in the Official Bulletin on Oct. 21, 2002.
67. See CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE Fu-
TURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2001), for an insightful analysis of
the tensions between decision-making bodies and dispute settlement bodies in
trade agreements.
68. See DEEPENING DISCIPLINES FOR TRADE-IN SERVICES, supra note 41, at 22.
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State must give any other Member the opportunity to demonstrate that
the education and experience obtained in their territory could be recog-
nized on the same footing as others.
The Protocol aims not only to discipline Member States' recognition
practices, but also to promote the use of mutual recognition agreements
as a means of advancing the liberalization of services. For this purpose,
the Protocol relies on the efforts made by professional bodies in coopera-
tion with governmental agencies. Each Member State is committed to
encourage these bodies to develop mutually accepted standards and crite-
ria for the provision of professional services and to make proposals to the
CMG on mutual recognition in this area. The CMG would in its turn
adopt those recommendations, previously examining their suitability and
consistency with the Protocol.
So far, a first step to advance the mutual recognition of professional
qualifications with a view to grant temporal licenses to professional ser-
vice providers has recently been taken. The CMC has approved a set of
guidelines to assist professional bodies to reach mutual recognition agree-
ments on professional qualifications and help them to develop common
rules on temporal licenses for professionals from one Member State to
provide services on the territory of any other Member State.69 The CMC
Decision also sets some minimum requirements that should be met for
issuing temporal licenses, such as: (1) the need of a services contract; (2)
the professional's obligation to restrict its professional activities to what is
stated in the contract; (3) the implementation of a common ethical code
for each profession; and (4) a limit for the license term to a maximum of
two years.70
In addition, Member States had already approved some mutual recog-
nition agreements on certificates, diplomas, and studies at primary, sec-
ondary, and university levels for the purpose of promoting educational
integration rather than for advancing services integration.71 For instance,
69. See CMC Decision No. 25/03 of Dec. 15, 2003, available at http://www.
MERCOSUR.org.uy.
70. Relying on professional bodies is not the only way to promote mutual recognition
agreements. The regional authorities themselves can also pass regulations by
which Members are under the obligation to recognize licenses, certificates, and
professional degrees issued in the territory of other Members. MERCOSUR
seems to have chosen the middle path between these two alternatives, relying on
non-governmental bodies but also setting minimum standards for the mutual rec-
ognition agreements. For more details and examples between these two alterna-
tives, see DEEPENING DISCIPLINES FOR TRADE-IN SERVICES, supra note 41, at 18.
71. See Protocol on Educational Integration and Recognition of Primary and Secon-
dary Level Certificates and Studies of a Non Technical Character, approved by
CMC Decision 4/94 of Aug. 5, 1994, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy;
Protocol on Educational Integration, and Recognition of Diplomas, Certificates,
and Studies on Technical Education, approved by CMC Decision 7/95 of Aug. 5,
1995, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy; Protocol on Educational Inte-
gration on the Recognition of University Degrees for the Purpose of Undertaking
Postgraduate Studies in MERCOSUR Universities, approved by CMC Decision 8/
96 of Dec. 17, 1996, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy [hereinafter Pro-
tocol on Educational Integration on the Recognition of University].
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the Protocol on the Mutual Recognition of University Degrees expressly
states that the recognition is for the sole purpose of undertaking post-
graduate studies in MERCOSUR Universities. 72
In summary, there are some features of the Montevideo Protocol that
will probably impair its capacity to promote an effective liberalization of
trade-in services once it enters into force. The first feature is the limita-
tion on its scope of application, which leaves the provision of services by
natural persons and government procurement of some type of services
aside from its disciplines. Its bottom-up approach towards the liberaliza-
tion of services is also questionable in the context of an agreement that
aims to establish a common market where the free circulation of services
should be the rule and not the exception. The Protocol also sets strict
standards that aim to discipline Member's regulatory practices. However,
the impact of these standards will largely depend on the effectiveness of
the dispute settlement system rather than on the Protocol itself.
IV. THE SERVICES' LIBERALIZATION PROGRAM
The Montevideo Protocol includes a liberalization program that com-
pels Member States to enter into successive annual rounds of negotia-
tions with a view to liberalize trade by progressively incorporating service
sectors and modes of supply into their schedules of specific commitments.
According to this program, the liberalization of trade-in services must be
completed within ten years of the date the agreement enters into force.73
The round of negotiations started in 1999, and so far, four rounds of ne-
gotiations have been concluded. The fifth round, which was launched in
December 2003,74 is currently under way.
The results of the negotiations are contained in each Member States'
schedule of specific commitments. Each schedule contains the Member's
commitments on market access and national treatment in relation to each
of the four modes of service supply for each service sector.75 One can
estimate the level of liberalization for each service sector by counting the
72. See Protocol on Educational Integration on the Recognition of University, supra
note 71, art. 1.
73. See supra note 58.
74. See CMG Res. 52/03 of Dec. 10, 2003, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.org.
uy.
75. The schedules of commitments are divided in two columns - market access and
national treatment. For each specific service sector there are eight entries, one for
each mode of supply in the market access column and one for each mode of supply
in the national treatment column. Entries can be UNBOUND (the country does
not undertake any commitment with respect to that mode of supply), BOUND
with limitations (the country undertakes the commitment to grant market access
or national treatment to that mode of supply, except for specific situations men-
tioned in the schedule), and BOUND without limitations. The non-limited
BOUND commitments are recorded in the schedule as NONE entries. Each
NONE entry means the countries' bound commitment not to adopt market access
limitations or national treatment limitations for a specific mode of supply.
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number of non-limited bound commitments (NONE entries).76 The most
recent Member States' schedules have been analyzed according to this
method. Table 1 summarizes these findings.
Each Member's schedule includes a horizontal limitation that affects
the provision of services via the presence of natural persons. Members'
commitments regarding this mode of supply are unbound, except for
measures concerning the temporary entry and stay of senior personnel
like managers, executives, or specialists. Therefore, the four Members
reserve their right to introduce measures on the provision of services by
natural persons against market access and national treatment principles.
Brazil's and Paraguay's schedules include a horizontal limitation that
affects the provision of services via the commercial presence of service
providers from one Member in another Member's territory. The limita-
tion specifies that foreign service suppliers wishing to supply a service as
a juridical person in their territory must be organized as a legal entity
foreseen by their domestic laws. In addition, the Brazilian schedule states
that to be eligible for remittances, foreign service suppliers established in
Brazilian territory must be registered with the Central Bank of Brazil.
The following paragraphs examine the specific commitments on vari-
ous service sectors. The data shows important asymmetries regarding the
levels of liberalization, not only among Members themselves, but also
among service sectors within each Member's schedule.
A. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
In Argentina, the level of liberalization of professional services is mod-
erately high (63 percent), but any person seeking to provide professional
services in this country must obtain recognition of their professional de-
gree, enroll in the relevant college, and establish a registered office in the
country. In Brazil, the level of liberalization in this services sector is rela-
tively high as well (52 percent), although its schedule includes some limi-
tations for the provision of legal and accounting services by foreign
professionals. In Uruguay, the level of liberalization of professional ser-
vices is moderate (39 percent), and like in Argentina, foreign service
providers must obtain recognition of their professional degree by the rel-
76. BERNDARD M. HOEKMAN, TENTATIVE FIRST STEPS - AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON SERVICES (World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 1455, 1995), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/
14610_wps1455.pdf. In particular, see pages 14-16. Hoekman pioneered quantita-
tive methods for the estimation of the level of services liberalization. Stephenson
has applied this method to assess the degree of services liberalization achieved in
the GATS 1994 schedules of countries in the Western Hemisphere. See DEEPEN-
ING DISCIPLINES FOR TRADE-IN SERVICES, supra note 41, at 169-70. Basically, this
method consists of looking at the schedules and giving a value of "1" for an entry
of NONE for the same sub-sector and mode of supply scheduled for both market
access and national treatment. Eight NONE entries, means that there is no mea-
sure in force that limit the foreign service suppliers' market access rights or na-
tional treatment rights, whatever the mode of supply they employ. Hence, that
specific service sector is completely liberalized (100%). The fewer the number of
NONE entries, the lower the level of liberalization for that service sector.
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evant professional body or institution. Finally, Paraguay has not under-
taken any binding commitment in this sector (0 percent).
B. COMMUNICATION SERVICES
The postal services market is virtually closed in the four countries.
Brazil's schedule includes limitations on the market access column, and
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay have not yet undertaken binding com-
mitments in this service sector. The provision of Audiovisual Services is
very restricted as well. For instance, every country has domestic regula-
tions on radio and television transmission services that are against their
market access (state owned companies have preference over others on
the assignation of frequencies) and national treatment (television and ra-
dio companies must be owned by the nationals of each country) commit-
ments. Contrarily, Courier Services enjoy a high level of liberalization in
all countries but Paraguay.
The level of liberalization of telecommunication services is character-
ized by important asymmetries among Member States. It is in Argentina
where telecommunications enjoy the highest level of liberalization. In
the rest of the countries, the level of liberalization is significantly lower.
In Brazil for example, the number of NONE entries on market access and
national treatment is extremely high. However, this is overshadowed by
a horizontal limitation on market access and national treatment for all
basic telecommunication services that require from each service provider
a license from ANATEL. The licenses are granted only to juridical per-
sons duly constituted according to the Brazilian legislation and provided
that the majority of quotas or shares with voting rights belong to natural
persons with residence in Brazil. In Paraguay and Uruguay, the level of
liberalization of value added services (electronic mail, electronic data in-
terchange, etc.) is moderately high, but the basic telecommunication ser-
vices are provided under monopoly conditions by state-owned
enterprises.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
Along with postal services, environmental services including sewage,
refuse disposal, and sanitation services, are among those least liberalized.
State-owned enterprises under monopoly conditions or through local
government authorities tend to provide these services. In some situa-
tions, private contractors are allowed to enter this market under conces-
sion regimes, but competition in this sector tends to be highly restricted.
D. FINANCIAL SERVICES
In Argentina, financial services enjoy the highest level of liberalization.
There are, however, differences in the level of liberalization among finan-
cial services' sub-sectors. Insurance services tend to be more restricted
than banking and other financial services. Nevertheless, there are no lim-
itations for the commercial presence of foreign insurance service provid-
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ers, something that finds no parallel in any other Member State.77
Regarding banking and other financial services, Argentina's schedule
does not include limitations either to the commercial presence of foreign
service suppliers or to the consumption of financial services abroad.
In Uruguay, the level of liberalization of financial services is low. The
Uruguayan schedule includes horizontal limitations on the commercial
mode of supply of this kind of services. To operate in the Uruguayan
financial market, service suppliers need to obtain prior authorization
from the financial authorities. The authorization may be rejected on pre-
cautionary grounds, including the current state of the market. In addi-
tion, bank applications are subject to quantitative limitations established
by law.78 Table 1 indicates a higher level of liberalization for insurance
services (28 percent) than for banking and other financial services (15
percent). However, it must be noted that Uruguayan commitments on
insurance services remain unbound, except for services auxiliary to insur-
ance (including broking and agency services), where the NONE entries
are concentrated.
In Brazil and Paraguay, the level of liberalization of financial services is
very low. In fact, hardly any bound commitment can be found in their
schedules. In addition, both countries include horizontal limitations to
the commercial mode of supply of financial services. In Brazil, for in-
stance, the commercial presence of foreign financial service suppliers is
subject to prior authorization by the Executive Branch by means of a
presidential decree. All financial companies must be incorporated under
Brazilian law in the form of a "sociedade anOnima." Moreover, financial
service providers other than insurance service suppliers may be required
to fulfill specific conditions, and all members of senior level management
must be permanent residents in Brazil.
In summary, current schedules of specific commitments reveal that four
rounds of negotiations on the liberalization of the service sector have
yielded significant results. Progress has been made not only in terms of
the increased number of bound commitments, but also in terms of the
enhanced transparency of the schedules, which now specify with more
precision the measures that limit the application of market access and
national treatment principles. Compared with the country's lists of spe-
cific commitments at the multilateral level, the four regional schedules
comprise a deeper commitment towards the liberalization of services.79
That does not mean that the degree of liberalization already achieved is
sufficient. On the contrary, it stems from the previous analysis that a lot
77. It must be specified, however, that commitments related to services auxiliary to
insurance (including broking and agency services) remain unbounded.
78. Every year, the number of licenses for the operation of new banks cannot be more
than 10% higher than the authorizations granted during the previous year.
79. The differences vary among countries, but in general, the regional schedules cover
more service sectors, include more NONE entries in both the market access and
national treatment columns, and contain less unbound commitments.
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of work is yet to be done for the complete liberalization of services in the
region.
First, the four Members must make serious efforts to remove barriers
to the provision of services by foreign individuals in another Member's
territory. To date, mode four of supply remains out of the scope of mar-
ket access and national treatment principles in all service sectors for the
bulk of service suppliers. A limitation like this is at odds with an agree-
ment that aims to establish a common market. Some measures have re-
cently been taken to remove barriers to the free circulation of persons,
but there is still a long way to go to grant full market access and national
treatment to foreign individuals willing to supply services in other Mem-
ber's territories.
Second, there are worrying asymmetries among Member States in the
level of commitments towards the liberalization of services. This trend
undermines the liberalization program, which aims at "promoting the in-
terests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis and to secur-
ing an overall balance of rights and obligations."80 Therefore, future-
negotiating rounds should focus on trying to reverse this tendency. While
Paraguay is the country that has the lowest level of liberalization, the
major contribution must come from Brazil, because no substantive liber-
alization on trade-in services will be possible unless the largest economy
in the region is fully committed to it.
Third, there are service sectors in the four Member States where little
or no advances have yet been made in terms of their liberalization. Most
of these services are either provided directly by the State or with the par-
ticipation of private contractors, but under strictly regulated conditions.
As a consequence, the agreement fails to provide for a substantial
sectoral coverage, and thus fails to meet WTO standards for regional in-
tegration agreements.
V. OBSTACLES TO THE LIBERALIZATION OF
TRADE-IN SERVICES
This section looks at the main obstacles to the liberalization of trade-in
services in MERCOSUR. First, this section examines some common ob-
stacles present in any services' liberalization process. The analysis then
focuses on two MERCOSUR-specific obstacles: (1) the asymmetries
among its Members; and (2) the institutional framework.
A. COMMON OBSTACLES TO ANY SERVICES'
LIBERALIZATION PROCESS
All negotiations on services face some common obstacles. Services are
a relatively new issue in the trade agenda, and there is little experience
among trade negotiators on how to deal with them. The lack of informa-
tion on the potential economic impact of services' liberalization restrains
80. See Montevideo Protocol, supra note 16, art. XIX, § 1.
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trade negotiators from making commitments beyond the status quo. In
addition, negotiators face serious difficulties to determine when a given
exchange of specific commitments on services is broadly equivalent. 81
Unlike explicit border barriers to trade-in goods like tariffs or quotas,
barriers to trade-in services are more complex and less transparent. Mea-
sures that may affect trade-in services tend to be scattered all over the
legal system, in the form of laws, decrees, administrative procedures, and
so forth. These measures are not codified and in many cases, even the
domestic regulators are not fully aware of all of them. Combined to-
gether, novelty, complexity, lack of transparency, and lack of information
constitute a serious obstacle to advance the liberalization of services.
Apart from the above, probably one of the most important common
factors in slowing the pace of the liberalization process is the nature of
the issues at stake in any negotiation on services. Some services like fi-
nancial, transport, and business services lie at the heart of the economic
system. Others like health care, education, and water supply are respon-
sible for the basic needs of ordinary people. Governments frequently re-
sort to the regulation of services in order to meet their national policy
objectives and, therefore, are more reluctant to entering into interna-
tional agreements that limit their policy-making ability. As a conse-
quence, one should expect negotiations on trade-in services to be more
difficult, time consuming, and conservative than negotiations on trade-in
goods.
MERCOSUR negotiations on services are not immune to these com-
mon obstacles. First, there is little research on the impact of services'
liberalization on the economies of the bloc.8 2 Second, a complete inven-
tory of all the measures affecting trade-in services in the region has yet to
be made.83 Third, to be able to deal with the complexities of trade-in
services, negotiators need more training in this area.84 Finally, the
amount of resources devoted to negotiate trade-in services is far from
sufficient. As a result, the process of services' liberalization remains in
the hands of blindfolded negotiators. In addition, the level of govern-
81. See Stephenson & Prieto, supra note 41, at 280.
82. See, e.g., Julio Berlinsky, Negotiations of Trade-in Services: Countries of
MERCOSUR, NAFTA and the European Union, at 20, available at http://www.red
MERCOSUR.org/uy/wwc/Berlinski%20WWICS-RED.ppt (Aug. 4, 2003) (paper
presented at a WTO-CEI Seminar); Julio Berlinsky, La Liberalizaci6n del Comer-
cio de Servicios en los Paises del MERCOSUR, in EL DESAFIO DE INTEGRARSE
PARA CRECER 73 (Daniel Chudnovsky & Jos6 Marfa Fanelli eds., 2001); Julio Ber-
linsky, GATS Commitments and Policy Issues of MERCOSUR and NAFTA Coun-
tries, FTAA BRIEFINGS (6), available at http://www.redMERCOSUR.org.uy/brief6
eng.pdf (July 2003); MARCIO DE OLIVEIRA JR., UMA ANALISE DA LIBERALIZA-
(CAO DO COMPRCIO INTERNACIONAL DE SERVI(NOS NO MERCOSUL (IPEA, Doc.
No. 727, 2000), available at http://www.ipea.gov.br/pub/td/td_2000/td0727.pdf.
83. Stephenson has already remarked the need of developing a comprehensive inven-
tory of the legal measures affecting services trade in Latin American Countries.
See Stephenson Growing Participation, supra note 41, at 174.
84. See, e.g., Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA, FTAA: National Trade Capac-
ity Building Strategies, at http://www.ftaa-alca.orglTAssistance-e.asp (last visited
Sept. 11, 2004).
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ment intervention in some economies of the region is still significant.85
This raises the sensitivity of the issues at stake, and thus, the reluctance of
Members to undertake more ambitious commitments on the liberaliza-
tion of services, particularly when it comes to those services that are di-
rectly provided by the state under monopoly conditions.86
B. ASYMMETRIES AMONG MERCOSUR MEMBERS
Asymmetries among the parties to an integration agreement increase
the risk of an uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of the integra-
tion process among those parties. If this risk is not avoided and the inte-
gration process fails to generate equitable welfare gains for all the
participating parties, the incentives to remain within the agreement will
probably be affected. The problem of asymmetries is particularly acute
among MERCOSUR Members. The fact that so far, MERCOSUR
Members have encountered serious difficulties to address the conse-
quences that stem from these asymmetries constitutes in itself an obstacle
to the liberalization of services. The analysis of the impact of these asym-
metries on the integration process falls beyond the limits of this paper
and has been studied elsewhere. 87 However, considering the relevance of
this obstacle for the success of the integration process, including the ne-
gotiations on trade-in services, some references are made on the charac-
teristics of the asymmetries among Member States and on the measures
that have been implemented to address them.
Structural asymmetries are those based on factors "that shape the
economies' ability to benefit from increased market integration,"' 8 in-
cluding, among others, "economic size, factor endowments, per-capita in-
come levels, the degree of flexibility of goods and factors markets and the
level of economic development. '89
The depth of structural asymmetries among MERCOSUR Members is
quite significant. For instance, the population of Brazil is five times larger
than the population of Argentina, thirty times larger than the population
of Paraguay, and fifty times larger than the population of Uruguay. Bra-
85. According to the Index of Economic Freedom - 2004, the scores for Government
Intervention in the Economy are "mostly free" for Uruguay (2.0) and Argentina
(2.0), "mostly unfree" for Paraguay (3.0), and "repressed" for Brazil (4.0). The
scale goes from I to 5, where 1 is the best and 5 is the worst in terms of economic
freedom. Heritage Foundation, 2004 Index of Economic Freedom, at http://www.
heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2004).
86. Apart from Argentina, which has conducted a broad privatization process during
the 1990s, in the other countries of the bloc, many service sectors are directly pro-
vided by the state under monopoly conditions.
87. See ROBERTO BOUZAS, MECHANISMS FOR COMPENSATING THE ASYMMETRICAL
EFFECTS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND GLOBALISATION: LESSONS FROM
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN -THE CASE OF MERCOSUR (IADB,
2003), available at http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/SOCPonenciaBouzasENG.pdf
(document presented at the IADB seminar "Confronting the Challenges of Re-
gional Development in Latin America and the Caribbean").
88. See id. at 3.
89. See id. at 3.
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zil alone accounts for over 65 percent of the regional economic output,
while the combined output of Uruguay and Paraguay accounts for less
than 4 percent.
There is evidence showing that, as a result of the structural asymme-
tries, it has been more difficult for the smaller partners of the bloc to reap
the benefits from the integration process.90 In addition, because the per-
formance of their economies depend to a large extent on intra regional
trade flows, smaller partners are,quite vulnerable to regional economic
recessions. Being unable to seize the export opportunities that come with
a regional trade agreement and facing an increased vulnerability to re-
gional shocks does not seem to provide smaller partners with sound moti-
vations to advance the integration process into a deeper stage, including
the free circulation of services. This does not mean that smaller partners
are, as a matter of principle, against advancing into deeper levels of inte-
gration. On the contrary, they share strong commercial interests in the
region, and thus have enough incentives to be part of an agreement that,
in theory, provides their goods and services with preferential access to the
larger partners' markets. However, they are understandably more reluc-
tant to take more ambitious measures under circumstances where the
costs stemming from structural asymmetries outweigh the potential bene-
fits of increased market access opportunities.
Structural asymmetries also contribute to erode the larger partners' in-
terest in the bloc. For instance, for Brazil, the economic relevance of
other Members' markets is much lower than the relevance its own market
represents for the other Members. 91 Therefore, when it comes to the ne-
gotiation of more ambitious forms of integration, Brazil will find it less
attractive than the other Members to agree on measures that restrict its
domestic regulatory autonomy in exchange for better market access con-
ditions at the regional level.
Despite the seriousness of the structural asymmetry problem, 92
MERCOSUR's tradition has been more about emphasizing the reciproc-
ity of obligations among Members, rather than granting special and dif-
ferential treatment for disadvantaged Members and regions. 93 Recently,
90. See Fernando Masi & Gustavo Bittencourt, Las Economias Pequenas en el
MERCOSUR: Evolucion y Perspectivas de Desarrolo, in EL DESAFtO DE IN-
TEGRARSE PARA CRECER 375-398 (Daniel Chudnovsky & Jose Maria Fanelli eds.,
2001). The authors claim that smaller partners failed to exploit fully
MERCOSUR's export opportunities. Instead of exporting products with dynamic
comparative advantages, their export sectors are concentrated on products with
static comparative advantages.
91. From 1994 to 2001, the average percentage of exports to the region out of its total
exports was 14% for Brazil, 32% for Argentina, 47% for Uruguay, and 54% for
Paraguay. See MERCOSUR's Statistics Tables, supra note 7.
92. There are structural asymmetries not only among countries, but also among re-
gions within the same country. See Bouzas, supra note 87, at 7-8.
93. There are very few references to special and differential treatment in
MERCOSUR Agreements. See Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 2, arts. 1, 6-7, An-
nex I, 30 I.L.M. at 1044-45, 1046, 1050-53. These provisions provide Paraguay and
Uruguay with little extra time to complete the trade-in goods liberalization pro-
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however, the issue of structural asymmetries seems to have gained mo-
mentum, 94 and several measures on special and differential treatment
have been proposed.95 It is untimely to predict whether any of these pro-
posals will be finally implemented and how effective they could be.
Whatever their results, Members will have to face the tough political hur-
dle of deciding who should be the major contributors and who should be
the major recipients of these measures. 96
Policy asymmetries are basically those that stem from different national
public policy preferences. The lack of adequate coordination between
the Members of a regional agreement on their public policy choices can
generate negative cross-border spillovers. For instance, disparities on
Members' public sector incentives distort trade flows and investment lo-
cations producing efficiency losses. In the same vein, disparities on
macroeconomic policies can undermine competitive conditions within the
bloc. As a reaction against the spillovers, affected Members tend to im-
plement protectionist measures. The deeper the level of interdependence
among the economies of the region, the more damaging the effects of the
cross-border spillovers on the integration process, and thus, the less at-
tractive the integration process becomes for its Members.
MERCOSUR history is fraught with policy asymmetry examples, from
competitive public incentive regimes for foreign investments to incompat-
ible stabilization programs. Despite the efforts made, this problem re-
mains largely unsolved.97 Macroeconomic coordination efforts are still at
a preliminary stage. Neither the two Protocols on foreign investment
aimed at disciplining Members' investment incentive regimes, nor the
Protocol to Safeguard Competition aimed at disciplining public policies
with distorting effects on competition, have entered into force. These
asymmetries and the unsuccessful attempts to discipline them have un-
dermined two key conditions for the success of an ambitious integration
process - market access and fair competition.
gramme. The Montevideo Protocol does not include provisions on special and
differential treatment. There is only a reference in the Protocol's preamble to "the
need of growing participation of countries and regions less developed," but this
phrase is immediately followed by another one which emphasises the need to pro-
mote trade-in services on a reciprocal basis. See Montevideo Protocol, supra note
16, pmbl.
94. See, e.g., Ext/Act CMC Meeting No. 01/03 of Oct. 6, 2003, available at http://www.
MERCOSUR.org.uy; Act CMC Meeting No. 02/03 of Dec. 15, 2003, available at
http://www.MERCOSUR.org.uy.
95. In October 2003, Paraguay (Anexo V - MERCOSUR/XXIV CMC/DT N2 01/03),
Uruguay (Anexo V Reservado - MERCOSUR/IV CMC EXT/DT N' 12/03), and
Argentina (Anexo VI Reservado - MERCOSUR/ IV CMC EXT/ DTs N2 13/03 y
14/03), submitted proposals on the treatment of asymmetries. On December 15,
2003, the CMC approved Recommendations 04/03 and 5/03, on the treatment of
asymmetries. Finally, MERCOSUR's Working Programme 2004-2006, approved
by CMC Decision 26/03 of Dec. 16, 2003, available at http://www.MERCOSUR.
org.uy, includes the task to study the creation of a structural adjustment fund.
96. See Bouzas, supra note 87, at 23.
97. For a detailed analysis on allocation cross-border spillovers and macroeconomic
cross-border spillovers and on the measures implemented with a view to address
their consequences, see id. at 12-22.
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Structural and policy asymmetries among MERCOSUR Members are
two huge obstacles to the establishment of a common market. The inte-
gration process will not be able to advance into a deeper level, including
the free circulation of services, unless effective mechanisms to compen-
sate structural asymmetries and to discipline policy asymmetries are put
in place.
C. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The transaction costs of negotiating, implementing, and enforcing com-
mitments aimed at removing barriers to trade-in services are quite signifi-
cant. The more ambitious the commitments are in liberalizing trade-in
services, the higher their transaction costs. Research on the relationship
between the institutional framework of regional integration agreements
and the level of liberalization of trade-in services has revealed that some
institutional features are more effective than others in reducing those
transaction costs. They are thus more effective in allowing the parties to
the agreement to reach deeper commitments on services. 98 According to
Stephenson's findings, the type of institutional framework that tends to
be more effective in minimizing the transaction costs is characterized by
several factors: (1) a significant amount of domestic power deferred to
supranational authorities; (2) a majority voting system; (3) direct effect
on domestic jurisdictions of rules passed by regional authorities; and (4) a
strong dispute settlement system.99
By contrast, MERCOSUR's institutional framework is characterized
by: (1) a strong intergovernmental bias; (2) a decision system based on
consensus; (3) lack of direct effect of MERCOSUR regulations on the
domestic jurisdiction of its Members; and (4) a relatively weak dispute
settlement system.10 0 Essential instruments to secure the free circulation
98. See A Comparison of Existing Services Trade Arrangements within APEC, supra
note 41, at 22-25.
99. See id. at 23. Trebilcock and House argue in the same line as Stephenson. They
state that because of constant changes to both the technological and regulatory
framework of the service sector, the negotiation for the removal of obstacles to
trade-in services needs to be carried within a genuine supranational organization,
capable of facilitating ongoing negotiations and adjustment commitments. See
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOUSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 306 (Routledge, 2d ed. 1999).
100. MERCOSUR's institutional framework is formed by three intergovernmental
bodies with decision making power: (1) the CMC, responsible for the political
leadership of the integration process; (2) the CMG, responsible, among other du-
ties, for monitoring compliance with the Treaty and for taking the necessary mea-
sures to enforce the decisions adopted by the CMC; and (3) the MERCOSUR
Trade Commission, responsible for assisting the CMG to monitor the application
of the common trade policy instruments in connection with the operation of the
customs union. The decisions of the three bodies are binding upon MERCOSUR
Members and are taken by consensus in the presence of all of them. However,
those decisions have no supra-national authority and Members have to take all
necessary measures, in their respective territories, to ensure compliance. See Ouro
Preto Protocol, supra note 11, art. 40, 34 I.L.M. at 1256. The Protocol of Olivos
has significantly improved the previous dispute settlement system, inter alia, by
creating a Permanent Review Tribunal. However, access to the dispute settlement
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of services have not entered into force10 1 and there is a significant "imple-
mentation gap"' 0 2 of MERCOSUR's regulations in Members' domestic
legal systems. Despite the work in progress aimed at strengthening it,103
MERCOSUR's institutional infrastructure is not yet suitable to deal with
transaction cost intensive issues like services.
There is a general assumption that parties to trade agreements design
institutional frameworks whose gains, in terms of reducing discriminatory
and non-discriminatory barriers to trade, exceed their costs. 1°4 From this
perspective, MERCOSUR's institutional framework may not be the most
adequate for advancing the liberalization of services, but it fits into each
Member's costs and benefits equation. Structural and policy asymme-
tries, differences in the degree of dependence of each Member's economy
on the region, and differences in each Member's incentives to remain in
the bloc, are all factors that support the claim for a flexible institutional
framework, which grants each Member a strong control over the integra-
tion process. Unless these factors change, it is unlikely that
MERCOSUR's institutional framework will evolve into one more appro-
priate for a common market involving the free circulation of services.
VI. THE WAY AHEAD
This paper examined MERCOSUR's negotiations on services since its
inception until present time. The analysis revealed that after thirteen
years, MERCOSUR Members have failed to put in place the necessary
conditions for the operation of a common market involving the free circu-
lation of services. During this period, a regional regulatory framework
for trade-in services was approved and Members entered into successive
rounds of negotiations aimed at removing barriers to trade-in services. In
addition, common rules on two vital areas for an effective liberalization
on trade-in services-investment and government procurement-were
also approved. However, an in-depth examination of these measures ex-
posed their limitations. The instruments on services, investment, and
government procurement have not yet entered into force, and the results
of the negotiation rounds have been overshadowed by the different levels
of commitments undertaken by each Member State.
The analysis also revealed that apart from some common difficulties to
all negotiations on services, such as lack of information and inexperience
in dealing with new and complex trade issues, there are other reasons for
system continues to be restricted for States only. See Protocolo de Olivos, supra
note 66, art. 1, 42 I.L.M. at 2-3.
101. See, e.g., Colonia Protocol on Investment, Montevideo Protocol, Protocol to Safe-
guard Competition, Protocol on Government Procurement.
102. See Bouzas, supra note 4, at 180.
103. See MERCOSUR Working Program 2004-2006, supra note 95.
104. See DEEPENING DISCIPLINES FOR TRADE-IN SERVICES, supra note 41, at 23 (citing
Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International
Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 12 Nw. J.
INT' L . & BUS. 470 (1996/1997)).
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the scant progress made on the liberalization of services. These reasons
are associated with MERCOSUR's difficulties in moving beyond an
agreement focused on the removal of border barriers to trade-in goods.
To advance into a deeper level of integration involving the free circula-
tion of services, it is essential that markets operate under open, transpar-
ent, certain, and fair trade conditions. Despite the efforts that have been
made to address the situation, MERCOSUR's market conditions remain
affected by within-the-border barriers to trade, unfair trade practices, and
incentive regimes that distort investment locations.
In theory, the way ahead would be to strengthen MERCOSUR's insti-
tutional framework to the point where it can discipline those Members'
practices that impair market access and distort competition. In practice,
however, MERCOSUR Members, particularly Brazil, are reluctant to
lose the degree of flexibility that comes with more powerful regional in-
stitutions. One way to unlock the situation would be for Members to find
incentives to agree on more ambitious measures of integration, including
creating institutions with supranational authority whose benefits could
outweigh the costs associated with the partial loss of regulatory
autonomy.
MERCOSUR's external relations are one area that has the potential to
revitalize Members' interest in the regional agreement, and thus, pave the
way to advance into a deeper form of integration. The external agenda is
expanding steadily and MERCOSUR is currently engaged in several ne-
gotiations with individual countries and regional blocs. There are, of
course, internal differences on how to conduct the negotiations, but it is
clear to all MERCOSUR Members that by negotiating as a bloc, rather
than negotiating separately, they can maximize their bargaining power
and increase the probability of obtaining better deals.
Another area that may provide Members with an incentive to pay
prices commensurate with deeper integration is that of public goods such
as infrastructure, research and development, environmental protection,
and so forth. The case for regional cooperation in the provision of public
goods is not difficult to justify. Such cooperation can generate large ben-
efits by reducing costs and avoiding unfair enrichment situations that
force all Members to contribute to the provision of goods that benefit the
region as a whole. In the past, Member States have been involved in
some regional infrastructure projects in the waterway and land transport
areas, but the emphasis has been on trade, leaving regional cooperation
on public goods as an under-exploited dimension of the integration pro-
cess. MERCOSUR's Working Program 2004-2006 contains references to
regional cooperation on science and technology, physical and energy in-
frastructure, and on the joint promotion of exports in third-world coun-
tries, which if effectively implemented, may act as a catalyst for a deeper
integration.
Aside from the potential of MERCOSUR's external relations and co-
operation projects on the provision of public goods to stimulate Mem-
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ber's interest in the integration process, there are other factors that can
contribute to facilitate the liberalization of trade-in services in the bloc.
The first factor is the domestic law reform processes. With differences
in their intensity, the four MERCOSUR Members are involved in law
reform processes at the domestic level, which range from the privatiza-
tion of state owned enterprises, to the streamlining of administrative reg-
ulations that interfere with the operation of markets. The impact of these
reforms on the liberalization of trade-in services will vary according to
their depth and scope of coverage, but in general, they will contribute to
open new sectors to the services market and to reduce regulatory barriers
to trade-in services.
The second factor is the WTO's authority to discipline integration ini-
tiatives. It is in the interest of the world trading community to preserve
an open multilateral trading system and to prevent regional blocs from
creating new forms of discrimination in international trade relations.
Therefore, when entering into regional agreements, WTO Members must
comply with WTO standards on regionalism. Article five of GATS indi-
cates that regional agreements must have "substantial coverage" and pro-
vide for the elimination of "substantially all discrimination." If
MERCOSUR Members failed to observe these standards they could be
forced to expand the agreement's scope of coverage or to amplify their
liberalization commitments. So far, the WTO has been reluctant to disci-
pline Members' regional integration strategies, but the WTO does have
the power to do so, and as a consequence, the power to contribute to the
liberalization of services within regional agreements. Accordingly, this
factor should not be overlooked.
The final factor that can contribute to facilitate the liberalization of
trade-in services is the economy's own dynamics. The relevance of the
services sector for the operation of the economic system, and thus, the
demand and supply of services are growing steadily, fostered by a com-
plex combination of factors, from technological developments to out-
sourcing practices. These factors are stronger than any interest to resist
the liberalization of services, and in the long run, the economic need for
trade-in services will probably override those interests.
In summary, the free circulation of services in MERCOSUR continues
to be a pending task, and it is unlikely that significant changes will take
place in the short run. It is debatable, however, as to what may happen in
the medium or long-term. While there are strong forces calling for the
liberalization of trade-in services, it is not clear whether MERCOSUR
Members will be ready to pay the costs for the implementation of a more
ambitious institutional infrastructure necessary for the operation of a
common market.
